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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of the Ulgent need for the capital income tax restructuring 
in Greece in order the countly to meet its recent exp osure to the EMU tax competition (as 
accentuated by the economic globalization) . The unsuccessful income tax harmonization 
in the European Urtion (EU) has intensified tax competition among the member countries, 
entailing reduction of effective tax rates. Such a tax competition is an inescapable policy for 
the countries adhered to the basic structure of income tax as intem.ationally applied. However, 
this is quite p ainfu l for countries of high ta¥ation and public debt, like Greece. On the other 
hand, the fundamental restl1tcturing of the Greek income tax towards the Cash Flaw Income 
Tax, effected on the basis of equal revenue yield, seems to offer the country the necessmy tax 
competitive advantage against the competitors in the EMU. Under such restructuring, the 
domestic or imported incom e and profits invested in Greece will be dispensed with the indig-
enOU5 equity and efficiency deficiencies of'the current tax system (since they will be relieved of 
any tax burden), thl£I' making the economy attractive of fun dI' on a fax induced basis (without 
discriminating between cun-ent andfuture consumption). To this end, the paper exa.rnines the 
relative merits of such a p olicy in the domestic and intemational setting of Greece, purporting 
to constitute a staning point for a thorough examination in this respect. 
Keywords: Tax, EMU, Income Taxation 
JEL Classification: E62. E69 
1. Introduction 
Income taxation in Greece has e;>"'Perienced systematic Governments' interven-
tions mainly as the most effective means of raising revenue. In the last decade, these 
interventions were intensified under a strict fiscal policy implementation, necessary 
for securing country's entrance to the EMU. Notwithstanding the fact that, in many 
instances, income tax interventions constituted major reforms, these, striking more 
at the level and distribution of the burden and the compliance and enforcement 
requirements and less at structural aspects, were lacking the fundamental reform 
trait and typically conceived in closed-economy settings.! Be that as it may, the 
gradual openness of the Greek economy in the 1990s, and especially the liberaliza-
tion of all its capital flows within the frame of EMU since 2000, suggests that the 
income tax is likely to succeed only if it is tailored to the international situation of 
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the Greek economy, Such a tailoring has nowadays turned to be most urgent than 
ever, given the tax competition environment prevailing in the EU, as a result of the 
unsuccessful attempts to harmonizing or coordinating the Member-States income 
tax, and the intensity of such competition, as volumes of international financial 
flows and of cross border savings are increasing rapidly. The introduction of the 
Euro removes currency risks and differences in interest rates within the EMU. Tax 
differences will be the main remaining issue to be resolved. FOI' Greece to stand 
successfully in such a demanding environment, presupposes fundamental income 
tax reform with special impact on the international and predominantly in the EU 
setting. Any other approach, of the kind of reciprocating or responding to the other 
Member-States competing tax: arrangements, will be a beggar-thy-neighbor policy 
which may be followed by fiscal degradation? 
To this end, the paper identifies, examines and formulates such a radical tax 
reform within the basic structure and function of the cash-flow income tax. It is 
concluded that the Cash-Flow Income Tax allows scope for Greece to gain a sus-
tainable competitive advantage placing it ahead of the other Member-States of 
the ED. This model will promote the fairness, efficiency and administration of the 
income tax system of Greece on the domestic and international level. 
2. The Concept of Fundamental Tax Reform: Comprehensive versus Cash-
Flow Income Tax 
Any tax reform contemplation should be based on an ideal tax system against 
which proposals can be evaluated. Disagreements on the nature of the ideal tax 
system encompass the most fundamental issue for levying taxes, that of the fairness 
in taxation. Fairness dictates that persons with the same ability to pay should bear 
the same tax burden. If this condition is violated problems willi be created from 
equity, efficiency and administrative standpoints. The debate ranges over income 
and consumption as alternative measures of individual's ability to pay in their ideal 
forms, and particularly between Comprehensive Income tax (CIT) and Cash Flow 
Income Tax (CFIT) respectively. 
The Evolution of the Worldwide Income Tax Reform 
From the outset of 1970,- and hence, the Expenditure Tax has been progressively 
established as one of the two models or ideals for evaluating income tax policy,1 
the other being the Haig .. Simons accretion ideal or Comprehensive Income Tax. 
The major tax reform in the western countries, which started from the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 in USA and swiped in Europe, sought to broaden the base and lower 
the rates of the existing personal and corporate income taxes. This reform was 
not necessarily fundamental, in the sense of succeeding to implement to a satis-
factory extent the structure of the Comprehensive Income Tax.4 In the end, the 
potential gains of such a reform were not enough to cancel the renewal interest 
Tanzi Vito (1995), p.7. 
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in fundamental tax reform, but this time in the direction towards the Expenditure 
Tax ideal.s The current national systems of income taxation are often criticized 
as variably falling off the generally acceptable goals of taxation, and particularly 
as being, to a lesser or greater extent, administratively complicated, depressive of 
saving and enterpreneurship (and consequently of growth) and inequitable.6 This 
criticism keeps up the controversial issue of whether the principal innate traits of 
the progressive income taxation have the potential to meet, in a balanced way, the 
generally accept2lble goals of taxation, or alternatively depart in practice from the 
norm as the less-worst choice to this effect. 
On the other hand, implemented or contemplating tax reforms, whether 
fundamental or not, are with reference mostly to domestic goals of the nations 
concerned. However, as economies are exposed to the rest of the world the attain-
ment of these goals becomes pervasive under the increasing impact of international 
considerations. 
The Comprehensive Income Tax in Theory and Practice 
The comprehensive income reflects the economic spending power in a period, 
expressed either in terms of its uses (i.e. as an outflow), comprising consumption 
plus all net accrual to wealth (real saving), or in terms of its accretion (as an inflow), 
encompassing all forms of return to human and non-human (real and financial) 
capital, including changes in the value of capital.7 The latter one, which constitutes 
the functional version of comprehensive income concept, comprises, in real terms 
(thus calling for inflation adjustmentt a) the conventional forms of income, (such 
as receipts, wages, salaries, interest, dividends, profits, rents, royalties, etc); b) the 
net appreciation of capital ownership (whether realized or not), provided that ap-
propriate allowance is made for averaging and loss offset; b) gifts and bequests; c) 
corporate source income (in the form of integration), whether distributed or not; 
and d) imputed rent of homeowners, combined with deduction of depreciation and 
mortgage adjustment. This concept of personal income, particularly theoretical, 
includes receipts from all possible sources which reflect taxable capacity. These 
receipts, summed up under a common unit of spending power, constitute the tax-
able base which is subjected to a progressive scale of tax rates. 
However, the application of this concept in practice presents particular problems 
reflected in numerous violations of its constituent principles in national income tax 
legislations. One important area in which national legislations violate the principles 
of the ideal system concerns the treatment of capital income. Four problems in this 
respect are central. The first refers to the requirement for inflation adjustments of 
the constituent elements of the income tax base (and especially the real economic 
depreciation, inventory costs, capital gains, and interest income and expenses), and 
of the income slices of the progressive tax rate schedule. Although administratively 
complex and burdensome, this will protect the equity and efficiency of the tax system. 
Aaron Henry (1997). 
See footnote 5. 
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The second concerns the thorny practical difficulties in measuring the accrual (not 
realized) capital gains in the absence of objective market prices for Ilumerous assets. 
This gives rise to the conflict between the ideal and applied concept of income, which 
is responsible for much inequity, inefficiency, and complexity. The third is the unequal 
treatment between current and future consumption, which, resulting from the annual 
taxation of the capital income, discourages the latter, with far-reaching repercussions 
on the efficient allocation of recourses and growth. The forth concerns the defini-
tional mandate for integrated corporate and personal taxation, which is violated in 
practice by the separate taxation of corporate income, for different reasons, among 
which is the avoidance of the potential deferral of tax on profits until distributed. 
This violation is accountable for double taxation of distributed profits, and unequal 
treatment between corporate and unincorporated businesses. Finally, the asymmetry 
of the capital income taxation, stemming from the unequal treatment of saving, and 
the subjection of the various categories of income under a common denominator to 
the progressive tax rate schedule, is accountable for the separate taxation of various 
categories of capital income and the numerous exemptions, credits and deductions, 
through which the governments try to support such desirable activities as particular 
business investments, homeownership, and retirement saving. 
The Cash Flow Income Tax 
On the other hand, the base of expenditure tax can be obtained from the compre-
hensive income as the accretion of economic spending power in a period, minus or 
plus the increase or decrease of the taxpayer's net worth in the period respectively, i.e. 
income less net saving or plus net dissaving. An expenditure tax is usually described as 
a tax on personal consumption, most suitably computed by the cash flow technique. 
This means that income and expendi ture cash flows are taken into account for each 
period, while changes in wealth due to changes in the value of individual assets do not 
affect tax liability. Assets do not have to be valuated. No effect appears on the annual 
tax return until an asset is converted into liquid holdings. Thus, unlike income tax, 
which is result oriented, expenditure tax is liquidity oriented. Use of the cash surplus 
forms the tax base. In this respect, purchases of financial assets would be deducted 
and subsequent earnings and withdrawals of principal for consumption purposes 
taxed (see table A, column 2). This cash flow treatment of assets is equivalent, in 
present value terms, to the tax prepaid or yield exemption treatment, under which no 
deduction would be allowed for purchases of asse ts but earnings and withdrawals of 
principal would be exempt from tax. Similar flexibility would be granted for loans 
(see table A, column 3). Deferral of tax in the present leads to payment of the same 
tax plus interests when the asset is sold for consumption. However, the payment of 
taxes occurs later under the cash flow method which allows a savings deduction than 
under the method which allows an interest exemption.9 
In a world of certainty, if all income is consumed over a life time and there is no tax on saving and 
no gifts or bequests, the present value of the life time consumption expenditures of two persons 
with the same lifetime income (also discounted to the present) is the same regardless of when they 
consume their incomes. Thus the expenditure tax has a lifetime perspective. 
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The Cash Flow Tax avoids the most difficult measurement problems of the 
comprehensive income tax mentioned earlier. In particular, inflation does not pose 
any problem for this tax (except for an adequate bracket indexation), because 
the calculation of the base involves only current year transactions. The tax base 
and the liabilities are always measured in consistent units. (Because all outlays 
for saving and investment would be fully deductible when they are made, there 
would be no deferred deductions to be eroded by inflation). There is no need for 
computing capital gains and depreciation charges, since the cost of capital from 
which they originate is fully deducted on acquisition. Such capital assets have a 
zero base on their acquisition, and the product of their disposal is taxed unless it 
is reinvested. There is, also, no need to discriminate between accrued and real-
ized capital gains, since the accruals add equally to both the income and saving, 
where the former offsets the latter. Furthermore, returns to capital which take an 
imputed form, such as imputed rent on housing, need not be measured under the 
pre-paid treatment. Under the CFIT there is no discrimination between current 
and future consumption, consequently there are no distortions in the timing of 
consumption. Thlls has the effect which is indeed the characteristic of the CFIT, 
that, at any given 'constant' marginal rate of tax, the (after tax) rate of return to 
the saver (from investing or lending his savings) in relation to the amount of his 
forgone (postponed) consumption is the same to the (before tax) rate of return 
on the underline loans or investments; whereas, under the income tax, the rate 
of return to the saver is set below the true yield of the loans or investments, thus 
canceling any tax induced incentive for taxpayers to substitute at the margin pres-
ent consumption for future consumption (see table A. columns 1 and 2).10 This 
difference is particularly important from an equity and an efficiency standpoint, 
as it becomes apparent in the case of a taxpayer who saving his current's year in-
come X for n year, with constant annual yield r and marginal tax rate t, consumes 
the principal and the accumulated yields at the end of that period. Under these 
circumstances, his after-tax rate of return on his forgone consumption and his total 
consumption will be respectively r(J.-t) and X(l-t)[l +r[l-t)"] in the CIT regime 
and rand X(l +r)"(l-t) in the CFIT, where each item of the former is lower than 
the respective one in the latter. l1 The greater the n the greater the discrepancy of 
the total consumption between the two regimes. 
Finally, under the CFIT the separate corporate tax looses importance, since the 
base of the tax does not by definition include funds until they are distributed and 
used for consumption. If, however, were desired to levy some charge on corporate 
activity as surveillance for the undistributed profits and for other reasons, this 
should be on the corporate cash flow. In particular, the corporate tax base would 
comprise receipts from all sources (as the sale of products and services), borrowed 
funds net of principal repayments, and interest received net of interest paid; less 
costs of materials and supplies, labor, and capital goods. Alternatively, the tax base 
may be estimated as payments out of the corporation to its shareholders, net of 
10 Meade J. F. (1978), p. 37; Goods Richard (1980), p.S8. 
11 Zacharopoulos K. (1999), pp. 167-169. 
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funds received from shareholders through the issuance of new stock.!2 Cash flow 
generated by unincorporated business is similarly calculated, but it would be at-
tributed directly to the owners of the business, as under current law, rather than 
taxed separately at the level of the business entity. Under such a cash flow corporate 
and unincorporated business profit tax, the rate of return on an entity's new capital 
development is not tCL'{ed unless the proceeds are distributed and not reinvested. 
For this reason such taxation is a suitable bedfellow for a personal expenditure 
tax. In particular, the post-tax rate of return to the investor is equal to the pre-tax 
rate of return on the underlying investment in real capital assets (see section 5). 
Under the personal and corporate cash flow, income taxes reduce or eliminate most 
distortions of saving and investment that would exist under even the most carefully 
crafted annual income taxY Thus the cash flow system not only meets the require-
ments of fairness but also terminates tax-induced distortions in saving. 
Corollary 
Be that as it may, the current income tax in various countries is in some re-
spects a cross between the Comprehensive Income Tax (CIT) and the Cash-Flow 
Income Tax (CFIT) ideals. Like a CIT, it taxes ordinary investment income, such 
as interest and dividends, and does not have any general deduction for saving. Like 
a CFIT, it fails to tax unrealized appreciation in value of assets, provides a number 
of particular deductions for items that realistically represent capital expenditures, 
and omits from taxable income returns on owner-occupied housing and consumer 
durables. The income tax applied in the industrialized countries does not go all 
the way in either of these directions. 
3. General Principles of International Taxation 
The Principles 
International taxation relies on the following two principles: the residence prin-
ciple according to which a COlUltry taxes the income of its residents, independently 
of the location of its source; and the source principle under which income is taxed in 
the country it arises, independently of the jurisdiction the recipient resides. Broadly, 
the fonner taxes a nation's savings and the latter taxes the income that arises from 
investments in it. However, the countries in practice tax both the foreign income of 
their residents and the domestic income of the foreigners. In a world in which both 
principles coexist, bilateral agreements for alleviating double taxation is necessary. 
The influential model treaties for most treaty negotiations between countries are 
that of OECD and UN ones. The former gives emphasis to the residence principle 
at the expense of the source principle, while the latter leaves to negotiations the 
capital income withholding tax rates of the source country paid out by foreigners. 
l2 The equivalence of the two methods follows from the identity that all sources of funds to the 
corporation must equal all uses of funds. 
13 The cash flow income tax to be paid by business can have, beyond the lax on cash flow to individu-
als, a withholding tax on payments to fore ign investors and companies (see section 5, below). 
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This explains why the developing countries (which are mainly importers of capital) 
prefer the UN model and the industrialized countries the OECD model (altghough 
even the last one is being questioning by those industrialized countries which has 
become a net importer of capital, like the USA).14 
In any case, since the source country has the first opportunity to tax it is typically in 
the responsibility of the residence country to establish double taxation relief provisions. 
If, for the sake of clarity, the tax rate and the rate of return is respectively td and rd at 
home, and tf and '1' abroad, these provisions can take the form of: crediting the foreign 
tax against the domestic tax liability with the later one calculated on a tax base inclusive 
of the gross of foreign tax income from abroad (tax credit metlwd), i.e. rj{l-td); or includ-
ing the net of foreign tax income from abroad in the calculations of the domestic tax 
liability (tax deduction method), i.e. rj{l-tf)(l-td); or exempting altogether the foreign 
income from the calculations of the domestic tax liability (tax exemption method), i.e. 
l1<l-tf). Uniform adoption of either the credit or exemption method would eliminate the 
double taxation problem, although with different implications for efficiency, whereas, 
the deduction method does not eliminate the problem of double taxation but it can 
increase the national welfare of the capital exporting country (as mentioned below). 
Three aspects of current practice lead to an effective application of source 
principle: credits of foreign tax in excess of the tax liability at home are not usually 
recognized, and as a result the residence countries refuse to payout refunds thereof 
typically bearing the foreign source tax (excess tax credit refusal); no domestic tax 
becomes due on incomes arising abroad until they are brought home (typical case 
being the incomes of home companies operating abroad through subsidiaries), thus 
blunting the impact of home taxes (tax deferral); and, it is notoriously difficult to 
ensure that foreign source portfolio income (interest and dividends) is reported to 
the authorities of the residence country and does not evade home taxes, thus being 
only subjected to the source withholding taxes (tax evasion). 
l<-1ficiency Criteria 
As a general proposition, the residence principle uniformly applying under a 
full credit provision (i.e. allowing refunds for any excess over the home tax liability) 
ensures Capital ExpOlt Neutrality (CEN). This is an efficient concept requiring that 
a resident of any particular jurisdiction face the same effective marginal rate of 
capital income taxation (reflecting the impact on marginal investment decisions of 
both rates and bases of taxation) regardless the jurisdiction in which they invest. If 
CEN holds, production is efficient, i.e. output could not be increased by reallocating 
firms' investments across countries. In other words, intercountry differences in the 
corporate and personal tax burdens would not affect the locational choice of invest-
ment (unless, if claims on domestic and foreign capital are not perfect substitutes, 
thus affecting the international pattern of investment). However, the existence of tax 
heaven countries that do not have interest in sharing information with the countries 
from which they attract capital, and of banking secrecy laws in many countries, makes 
countries unwilling to abide by this principle, thus imposing taxes at source. 
14 Tanzi Vito (1995), pp. 83-84. 
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By the same token, uniform application of the source principle ensures the 
Capital Import Neutrality (CIA~. This efficient condition requires that investment 
in particular jurisdiction face the same effective marginal tax rate whatever the 
residence of the investor. If eIN holds, the allocation of savings across consumers 
will be efficient in the sense that all savers, whatever their jurisdiction of residence, 
will receive the same after-tax return, that is, they will all face the same prices for 
future in terms of present consumption. Tha t is, intercountry differences in effec-
tive source tax rates would distort the location of investment but would not induce 
differences in the saving propensity of individuals residing in different countries. 
The identification of the efficiency criteria with the international taxation principles 
hold under the assumptions that capital income taxes are not forward or backward 
shifted, easily evaded and considered benefit charges (i.e. the tax burden is not offset 
by proportional benefits in the form of better infrastructure, legal structure, etc). In the 
case offorward profit tax shifting (to product prices), neutrality is achieved under the 
source principle (i.e. with the application of the tax exemption method by thc residence 
countries) and border tax adjustments on tradable goods. On the other hand, enforce-
ment of both principles at the corporate level is more effective than enforcement at the 
personal level. The personal portfolio (debt and equity) investment income is vulnerable 
to tax evasion, going to a greater or lesser extent unreported to the tax authorities and 
thus escaping the global inc.orne tax of the residence countly. Ibis violates the residence 
principle, but does not necessarily imply intetference with the CEN. In particular, to 
the extent that the financial capital attracted by tax heaven countries is not invested 
in them, the world allocation of real investments does not change and the before-tax 
world rate of return to that capital does not fall. Tax heaven countries are too small 
real economies to affect the allocation of real investment and thm: the return to real 
investment. On the contrary, when large real economies lower their tax rates, then, the 
financial capital attracted this way is usually followed by real investment, leading to a 
potential misallocation of recourses because of tax-induced additional investment and 
violating the CEN. In any case, efficient and unrestricted exchange of information about 
taxpayers' international incorne among the jurisdictions concerned, which is necessary 
condition for the effective enforcement of the residence and source principles, is not 
easy to be secured. This is due to the existence of tax heaven countries that do not have 
the interest to share information with countries from which they attract capital, and of 
banking secrecy laws on other countries, in addition to the legal, political and technical 
limitations that exist even among non tax heaven countIies. 
Given the tax priority of the source country and the application of foreign 
tax credit by the residence country, the CEN does not necessarily maximize the 
national welfare of the residence country. If the effective tax bwrden of the source 
country is greater than or equal to the residence country' one, the tax revenue is 
effectively collected by the source country. For enhancing the national welfare of 
the residence country, the after-foreign tax rate of return should be equal to the 
before-domestic tax rate of return. This is attained when the residence country 
applies the deduction rather than the credit method. I5 
15 Musgrave R. A. and Musgrave P. B. (1976), pp. 720-721; MacDougall G. D. A. (1960); Caves R. (1982). 
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Equity Criteria 
International taxation cannot be considered in terms of allocative efficiency 
alone, but equity must also be taken into account. Equity among the residents 
of a country should be handled through international tax coordination, whereas 
equity among residents of different countries presupposes equalized personal tax 
structures and benefits. Equity between factor ownership should be considered. In 
a closed economy the tax imposed on all assets of all sectors is being borne in the 
long run by the owners of capital. In an open economy the tax is shifted (through 
the exodus of capital) to less mobile factors, particularly unskilled labor, unless the 
residence principle is effectively enforced or harmonization of the tax structure is 
effected to particularly all countries with comparable investment. 
On the other hand intercountry equity in the distribution of tax revenue takes 
into account corporate income taxation, withholding taxes on interest payments and 
dividends to non-residents, and the degree of integration of personal and corporate 
tax systems across countries. Given the fact that the source country has the first 
opportunity to tax, the overall level of taxation and the distribution of tax revenue 
between the source and residence countries is being effectively determined by the 
treatment of foreign source capital income of the residence country. In any case, 
intercountry equi1y is at stake under the differential tax burdens of capital income 
among source countries that offer possibilities of tax fraud and evasion on the part 
of residence through various devices in the corporate and personal level, with far-
reaching implications for the level and allocation of tax revenue among countries. 
In the case of multinational companies where their profits are being allocated 
in the countries in which they operate, the problem is significant. The companies 
have an incentive to reallocating taxable profits to low-tax jurisdiction using transfer-
pricing devices (through inflating the costs of internationally intracompany trade 
of inputs that reduce the taxable profits in high-tax jurisdictions), discretionary 
allocation of fixed costs (such as those for research, development, and general 
management) or high charges for the use of brand names and other patents, to 
high-tax jurisdictions (thus reducing taxable profits therein), and financial arrange·· 
ments (through 'thin capitalization' in the form of shifting debt burdens and the 
associated interest deductibility to high - tax jurisdiction, i.e. through loan, instead 
of equity, finance from low-tax countries, thus showing less profits under an inflated 
debt-equity ratio to the high-tax jurisdiction). It should be clear that manipula-
tion of transfer prices tend to change more the location of taxable income and to 
a lesser degree the location of real investment. The arm's length prices criterion 
of tax authorities for establishing acceptable transfer pricing (that is determining 
the market prices for intracompany inputs) proves ambiguous and not very .16 The 
formula apportionment oftaxable profits (according to the territorial distribution of 
identifiable factors, such as the value of assets , payroll, or sales across jurisdictions) 
may acquire more legitimacy than now. These factors may be conceptually easy to 
l' The U.S.A. Treasury presented a report in which it suggested that multinational enterprises oper-
ating in the U.S.A. were systematically understating their profits: see Internal Revenue Services 
(\992). 
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identify, but their calculation in practice is particularly difficult under differences 
in currencies, and accounting and legal structures. 
On the other hand, tax-induced portfolio investment in tax-low countries vio-
lates the intercountry equity if the income derived from this goes unreported to 
the residence country. 
Corollary 
If the effective tax burden of the income from capital are equalized across 
countries and there is no discrimination between domestic and foreign investments, 
then tax systems can guarantee both capital export and capital import neutrality 
criteria. Regarding such a case as chimerical, the question posed in this respect is 
which of those two is more conducive to the collective good. 
«From the standpoint of the world welfare maximization, the choice between the 
two criteria depends on the degrees of inter temporal substitution in consumption 
and of international substitutability of investment. With relatively low intertemporal 
substitution in consumption (that is low interest elastici ty of savings) and relatively 
high international capital substitution (that is, high elasticity for investment with 
respect to differences in after-tax rates of return), violations of eIN should be less 
costly than violations of CEN».17 On the other hand, the residence principle may 
also be considered preferable on equity grounds because it is accommodative of 
the application of progressive global income tax of individuals, leaving a greater 
freedom of action to government as to the use of the income tax for redistributional 
purposes. 
4. Evolution of Direct Tax Harmonization in the EU 
Tax harmonization is an integral part of completing the single market of the EU, 
commanding attention also in a far wider context (beyond its physical frontiers), 
as determined by agreements of the EU with European Free Trade Association 
(forming the European Economic Area) , the Central and East European coun-
tries, etc. In the context of the Single European Act (EC Commission (1986a», 
tax harmonization involves the removal of tax distortions affecting commodity and 
factor movements in order to bring about a more efficient allocation of resources 
within an integrated market. Although interpersonal and intercountry equity is not 
an explicit EU objective, it is important in shaping government attitudes to various 
harmonization schemes. 
The Need for Tax Convergence The common external tariff policy (supple-
mented by abolition of inter-Member-State tariffs) and (to a satisfactory extent) 
uniform application of (the type and base of) commodity taxes (excise taxes and 
VAT) were achieved in EU under the explicit mandate of the Treaty of Rome. 
This may not have been too difficult especially in the case of commodity taxation 
which operating under the destination principle do not affect the territoriality of 
the Member States. 
--_._----. 
J7 Gardner Edward (July, 1992), pp. 53-54; Giovannin i, Alberto (October 1989), pp. 346-386. 
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However, the need for further harmonization of the tax systems of EU member-
states comes impJi.citly as intimately connected with the removal of border controls 
and restrictions mandated by the Single European Act of 1987, the establishment of 
the EMU and the adoption of a single currency (which altogether are very important 
steps towards the completion of the single market in the EU). The lack of explicit 
mandate in this respect, together with the fact that the harmonization of direct tax 
systems in the Member States entails the abolition of national sovereignty, were the 
main impediments to the progress so faLlS Tax harmonization seems least urgent 
as regards relatively immobile (especially unskilled) labor services and certain real 
assets (i.e. land). On the contrary, the convergence of the complex and particularly 
differentiated capital income taxation systems of the Member States is the most 
unsettling area of taxation under the effects of deepening economic integration. 
Differential effective rates of corporate and financial investment income taxation 
among countries exert far-reaching distortions in the allocation of capital, saving, 
risk and financial intermediation, and in the overall level of savings and investment. 
Equity, both at the interpersonal and intercountry level, is also being affected. 
Corporate tax systems of EU Member States, being primarily on a source taxa-
tion basis (consistent with the benefit approach), present considerable differences in 
the degree of their integration with the personal taxation, however, with an apparent 
ongoing convergence of their tax rates. These systems are differentiated among 
the classical system (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and 
Sweden), the partial imputation system (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and UK), the full imputation system (Finland) and a dividend exempt system 
(Greece ).19 With respect to double taxation alleviation of foreign direct investment 
income al most all residence Member States provide, as a general rule, for the credit 
method, and exceptionally the exemption or deduction methods. 
The taxation of the cross-border financial investment income (which origi-
nates from intere:;t on deposits or bond holdings, dividends and other financial 
investments) is subjected to the generally applied in the Member-States residence 
principle under double taxation relief provisions for any foreign source taxation 
(in the form of withholding taxes on dividends and interest receipts). 
The absence ojf withholding taxes to nonresident taxpayers and the inadequacy 
for foreign source income reporting enforcement enhance the scope for tax eva-
sion. On the other hand, there is the risk that many foreign taxpayers will avoid 
to keep or get their savings registered in any source country which introduces an 
effective exchange of information, even if they payor are prepared to pay a reason-
able withholding tax on the return (thUS pushing savings away of such countries 
or even away of the EU to overseas tax havens). Under these considerations, the 
liberalization of capital flows in the EU, effected in the 90s (with the removal, 
among other things, of administrative controls) led the Member-States to a variety 
of adjustments with respect to the form of enforcement at source-withholding and 
]8 Suffice to say that the sovereignty issue is mainly the snag of advancing the commodity tax hanlloni-
zation on the origin principle, which is more consistent with the completion of the singlc market. 
]9 EU corporation tax systems in 1998/1999; see Simon James and Nobes Christopber (1992), pp.294. 
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administrative practices concerning the non-residents saving income, at rates and 
at least on the willingness to exchange information determined from the under-
lined treaties or unilaterally. The income reporting requirements and the degree 
of exchange information vary across Member-States, from complete taxpayer 
anonymity (Luxembourg and Germany) to strict declaration rules and some form 
of inter member assistance (Spain, Denmark and France). Source-withholding 
taxes on dividends are levied across Member-States, following the tax treatment 
of corporations from a conceptual (as benefit charges) and structural (discrimina-
tion between corporate and personal level) standpoint, whereas source interest 
incomes and royalty payments withholding taxes are variably imposed with various 
degrees of coverage. However, the treatment of these incomes by the authorities of 
the countries in which they originate also varies, whereby some countries subject 
them to global income taxes, whereas others give them the particular treatment 
associated with schedular income taxes. 
EU Convelgence Approaches 
In sum, effective tax rate differentials of capital income across the Member··Stares 
give rise to tax induced distortions in the cross border capital flows. These distortions 
are at large one of the main obstacles EU faces towards the dcepening of the integrated 
market. Tax neutrality under a capital income tax harmonization across the Member-
States is the necessary condition for efficient allocation of resources within the EU 
(assuming no other policy-induced distortions, market imperfections, or externalities). 
The decision to invest or save at home or abroad should depend on before-tax rates of 
return··assuming uniform public selvice benefits at home and abroad. In the narrowly 
defined context of the Single European Act, tax harmonization implies convergence of 
the main determinants of effective ta" rates: statutory rates, tax base and enforcement 
practices. Efforts for such a convergence, ensuring CEN and CIN as mentioned earlier, 
gained momentum under the liberalization of capital ±lows in mid-1990. This, being 
practically (and thus politically) unattainable, led the Commission to the examination 
and efforts of other more feasible approaches to that effect. 
Tax coordination, as an alternative approach, aim to neutralize the effects of 
tax rate differentials on cross-border capital flows under multiraterally agreed tax 
adjustments, giving consequences dose to those of effective ta~ rate equalization. 
This can be effected by the consistent application of the residence principle on a 
uniform corporation income base and under the effective enforcement of the tax 
credit method (for double taxation relief) across the Member-States. Coordination 
of the cross border direct investment taxation derives from the pressures of tax 
evasion that result from full capital mobility, with differential tax burdens at source, 
and tax controls that remain constrained by national boundaries. However, there is 
no consensus as regards the principle (and consequently the neutrality objective) 
that should govern capital income taxation .. The lack of consensus is mainly due 
to the fact that the interests between net importers and exporters of capital do not 
coincide as they attempt to balance tax revenue needs and incentive effects. As 
a result, tax coordination seems uncertain in succeeding the necessary coopera-
tion between Member-States for the satisfactory offset of tax rate differentials 
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in the absence of border controls, giving the risk for new distortions. Hence, the 
harmonization of the tax structures would seem more necessary than ever. More 
generally, compared with tax coordination, tax harmonization should enhance 
welfare because convergence of income tax rates tends to equalize marginal rates 
of substitution between consumption and saving across countries (since it satisfies 
the CIN criterion as well) . 
Under tax competition, effective tax rates (net of benefits) tend to converge to 
the lowest common denominator. The outcome of such competition will depend on 
the revenue needs of the countries concerned. The countries will compete in their 
individual capacities trying to their detriment or advantage to adjust accordingly. A 
country with a relatively small public sector, or a large tax base, or operating as an 
international financial center, etc, is in a relatively advantageous position to lower 
effective rates of taxation (net of benefits) and to be more ready for a concerted 
tax harmonization. However, the natural approximation of taxes may be too slow 
leaving the EU exposed to distortions inherent to the existing systems. 
Corollary 
The EU has 11l0t been very successful in pushing forward the process of income 
tax convergence in its member countries: tax harmonization satisfies both efficient 
criteria but proves politically unattainable; tax coordination, satisfying only one or 
the other of the two efficient criteria, is restrained by the contradicting interests 
of the Member-States between these criteria; tax competition is a slow process 
of uncertain evolution, which, however, have so far succeeded some tax rate con-
vergence. As a result, a non-binding Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, as a 
coordinated action at European level to reduce continuing distortions in the single 
market, came into effect on 1 January 1998. 20 
20 The 1975 'Proposed Directive for the Harmonization of Systems of C'Almpany Taxation and of With-
holding Taxes on Dividends' recommended the most comprehensive corporate tax structure harmo-
nization: providing the imputation system at a common single statutory rate of tax and impu tation 
credit between 45% and 55%; applying the source principle with respect to the imputations system 
applied to dividends crossing the borders, with the budgetary cost of the tax credit borne by the host 
country; imposing 25% withholding tax on dividends to non-corporate shareholders; and cx1cnding tax 
credit to all EEC residents. The directive never adopted because the European Parliament (Official 
Journal, 1979) announced the ptior need to harmonize the computation of the corporate income tax 
base. However, in 1990, the Commission abandoned it, plans for general harmonization in order to 
concentrate on those details that particularly affect cross-border activity. These moves include: the 
adoption of the Parent-Suhsidiary Directive (Council 1990a), which is designed to reduce the taxation 
paid between companies resident in Member-States, where there is a holding of at least 25%; and the 
Merger Directive (Council 1990b) wh ich allows the deferral of capital gains on certain cross-border 
reorganizations. In 1992, the Ruding Committee reported to the EU (Commission, 1992) the reduc-
tion of the corporate tax rate band level and the harmoll .ization of tax bases. The recommendations of 
the Ruding Report have not been adopted, although corporate tax rates have generally fallen through 
nationally imposed legislation to the levels recommended. Tn May 1998 the European Commission 
presented a proposal for a Council Directive to ensure a min imum of effective taxation of savings 
income in the form of in terest payments within the Community (COM(1998)295). The Commission 
proposes coexistence model of excbange of infonna tion and withholding tax. The Memher-States 
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5. Restructuring Greek Capital Income Taxation in The International 
Setting 
The progressive income tax system, applied historically in the industrialized 
countries up to date, has never been consistent with the fundamental principles 
of the comprehensive ideal, either because is impracticable, or undesirable. The 
discrepancies from the norm in practice, reflecting to a lesser or greater effects the 
main deficiencies of the nature of the system itself, give rise to various distorting 
effects in the domestic and international environment. One of the main causes 
of these distortions stem from the manifold deviations of the ( after tax) rate of 
return to the savers from the (before tax) rate of return on investment, and the 
differentiation of the former according to the status of the savers-investors and 
the nature of the assets invested. 
The Indigenous Deficiencies of the Greek Income Taxation 
The problem is particularly indigenous to Greece. The criticism mainly focuses 
on the following: First, the conceptual inconsistencies of the system, where important 
categories of personal savings (i.e. pension contributions) escape taxation, primarily 
for social reasons, and capital allowances and other deductions are variably recog-
nized under the company taxation, for reasons of promoting investments. Second, 
the structural inconsistencies of the system, where the various categories of capital 
income, (i.e. undistributed and distributed companies' profits, interest, capital gains, 
etc), are independently taxed, for the purpose of affecting saving-investment in direc-
tions different from those entailed by subjecting these income categories altogether 
to the progressive scale of personal taxation, (like earnings). Third, the practical 
(and in most of cases insurmountable) difficulties in computing deprecations, capital 
gains/losses and inflationary adjustments. Fourth, the fact that the above inconsisten-
cies and practical difficulties create deep breach in the concept of tax equity. This 
is dear in the case of four persons of equal annual income from different sources 
and in particular from: earnings, subjected to the personal progressive scale of taxa-
tion (ranging from 5% to 42,5%); dividends burdened with 35% on the company 
level without any additional personal tax liability; and deposit interests and annual 
government bonds yield: proportionally burdened with 15% and 10% respectively in 
the form of withholding taxes exhausting this way any personal tax liability. Finally, 
the administrative complexities, in addition to aforementioned computational dif-
ficulties, as a result of the plethora of independent capital income taxes with their 
consequential complicated procedures of tax verification and collection. 
Current Taxation on Cross Border Capital Income in Greece 
On the other hand, the Greek border flows of income are subject to the tax 
structure of the country mentioned in the previous paragraph, adapted under the 
._------------_.-
have the choice between two systems: a) to enforce that information on interest payments on mainly 
bank savings going to residents of other Member -States is forwarded to the tax authorities of the home 
counlIy of the beneficiary of the payment.; and b) introduce a withholding tax of 20% of such interest 
payments. TIle withholding tax will be creditable against the tax on the intere:,t in the home conn try. 
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worldwide application of the residence and source principles and the tax credit 
method accordingly.21 In particular according to the domestic legislation, Greek 
resident individuals, corporations and personal businesses owe taxes to the Greek 
government on all of their worldwide income. The tax credit method is provided 
for foreign source income up to the amount of the corresponding domestic tax 
liability. Non-resiident individuals are subject to the Greek income tax for any 
Greek source income. Also, the worldwide and the Greek source income of Greek 
resident corporations and foreign resident corporations respectively are subject to 
the Greek tax legislation. However, the Greek (as any other national) tax legisla·. 
tion of cross border income flows, reflect domestic and consequently unilateral tax 
arrangements, subject to the risk for excessive claims against the foreign residents. 
As a result, Greece has singed bilateral treaties with various countries, for ensuring 
limitation of the tax claims of the source country and avoiding double taxation in 
the residence country. Tables Band C show the tax rates and the double taxation 
relief methods of a number of Greek bilateral treaties for interest income, dividends 
and branches' income or profits. The tax rates contained in the bilateral treaties are 
the maximum rates applied by the source country. If the source country legislation 
provides for lower or zero tax rates, it is these rates that should be applied. Branches 
and subsidiaries of foreign corporations are taxed according to the source country 
legislation for home companies without any discrimination, while the ambiguous 
arm's length prices criterion is provided for multinational companies. The income 
of home corporations and branches of foreign corporations is subject to 35% and 
37,5% rates according to whether the corporations are introduced or not to the 
Stock Exchange of their residence countries respectively; whereas the income of 
Greek companies of Ltd liability and partnerships (net of the 'entrepreneur charge' 
of the manager partner-associate, which is subjected to the personal progressive 
scale of taxation) is taxed with 35% and 25% respectively. Due to the special regime 
of corporate tax applied in Greece after Law 2065/1992, according to which the 
corporate profits are taxed on the name of the corporation, without any additional 
personal taxation on dividends, the tax rate for dividends provided for by the trea-
ties do not have any importance (see Table C, column of dividends). 
Different Philosophies 
Greece has being engaged in the income tax competition environment prevailing 
in the EU, owing to the liberalization of capital flows under a lack of any success-
ful harmonization or coordination in this field. In this respect, Greece faces three 
main constraints: the relative high tax ratios of the country; its revenue needs (as 
determined by its social welfare function, recourse endowment and public sector 
debt); and the fact that the deficiencies of current capital income taxation is (not 
an exclusive trait of the country but) an inescapable product of the internationally 
adopted choice of the CIT approach. Following necessarily the effective tax rate 
reduction policy of its competitors, Greece may minimize the costs but is very 
21 Art. 3 L.3323!55, as modified by art.2.1 of L.2238/98; Art. 4 L.3843/58, as modified by art. 99 of 
L.2238/98; Minist!)' of Finance: M 4500/1961, A 5178/1966. 
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difficult to gain any competitive advantage especially against its more efficient 
competitors. Adherence to the CIT version of capital income taxation preserves 
the aforementioned deficiencies of the system in relative terms, although at a 
lower distorting level (depending on the succeeded tax rate convergence). In any 
case, under the most optimistic estimates other things being equal, the competitive 
position of Greece is expected to remain relatively the same under these circum-
stances. The alternative in this respect would be a radical reform in the direction 
towards the CFIT. Such a reform will ensure Greece the necessary tax competitive 
impetus against its competitors, respecting the first two constraints and canceling 
the third one. The tax treatment of the domestic and the cross border income and 
profits of Greece will be relieved of the current deficiencies, and the economy will 
be attractive of funds on a tax induced basis. 
The International Cash-Flow Tax implications 
A shift by Greece from income to cash flow taxation would have major implica-
tions for international transactions. Although the definition of residence is difficult, 
the residence principle, if accepted internationally, would seem an appropriate 
basis for assessing a Cash Flow Tax (CFT) on personal and corporate level, that is 
a progressive personal CFIT coupled with a proportional Cash Flow Corporation 
Tax (CFCT), respectively. Under the CFIT, «receipts of residents will be included 
in the tax base, regardless of source; investments or savings of residents, whether at 
home or abroad would be deductible; and consumption of residents, would be taxed 
regardless of where it occurS».22 The need for foreign tax credit would be eJjminated, 
and the progressive scale structure would be applied only once to all consumption. 
In 'particular, given the fact that the remittance of CFIT (which is recognized by 
definition) when the funds are saved and invested is tantamount to remitting the 
tax on the subsequent yield on such funds (according to the equivalence between 
cash-flow and the pre-paid treatment of assets mentioned earlier) , then granting 
also double taxation relief (credit) on the yield on foreign investment, it is in effect 
giving a tax subsidy on foreign investment. Suppose that a 10% tax rate and a 50% 
underline rate of yield of real capital apply the same in a CFT and an Income Tax 
(IT) country. In both counties the market rate of interest will be linked to this 10% 
yield.23 Under these circumstances, IT country residents, will get a post-tax rate 
of return of 5% on their savings whether they invest them at home or in the CFT 
country, since in the latter case the foreign tax credit offset the home tax liability) . 
On the other hand, CFf country residents, will enjoy the pre-tax rate of return 
of 10% on their savings if they invest them at home, and of 10% or 5% if they 
invest them in the IT country, according to whether they do or do not enjoy in the 
CFIT country double taxation relief from income tax on their fore ign investment 
income. Thus, the refusal of the CFT' country of one or other of the two tax reliefs 
(on overseas investment or double tax relief on the yield on overseas investment) 
will operate as disincentive for the CFIT country's savings to be invested abroad, 
22 Graetz Michael (1980) , p.249. 
23 For a deeper analysis on this, see Hines James (1996), pp.473-480. 
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a disincentive «which springs, not from any tax discrimination by the ET country, 
but from the simple fact that the ET [CFIT] has devised a tax regime to stimulate 
savings-investment, while the IT country has not chosen to do SO».24 Furthermore, 
granting double tax relief on foreign income , that is giving credit of foreign source 
income tax against domestic expenditure tax, is not consistent from a conceptual 
and structural standpoint. 
On the other hand, the CFCT of section 2 (confined to corporations), like the 
CFIT (confined to individuals) does not break the link between the market interest 
rate and the pre-tax rate of yield on company' real assets; and in addition, raises 
the same issues as to whether it is desirable to grand both tax reliefs on the foreign 
investment and also on the subsequent income from that investment. 
As to the first, it should be noted, that the provision for 100% capital allow-
ances (i.e. the deduction of capital assets acquisition) has the effect to equalize 
the pre-tax rate of return on real assets with the post-tax interest rate. As is shown 
in table A (column 4), given the above IT country and CFT country (with the 
same tax rate and initial yield on investment, say 50% and 10% respectively), an 
IT country resident investor in real assets will get a post-tax rate of return of 5% 
investing at home, and 10% investing in the CFT country. With 100% capital al-
lowances in the CFT country, the investor will be able to finance a capital asset of 
a total value (1.500DRC) which would be in excess of his independent investment 
(750DRC) by the remission of 50% corporation tax on that value (50%X1.500). 
As a result, he gets a pre-tax return (1O%X1.500= 150) which: as percentage of 
his independent investment (150/750=20%) corresponds to a market interest 
rate; and as percentage of his total investment (150/1500= 10%) is higher than 
the previous one, standing for the rate of return on the underlying investment in 
real assets. Under these circumstances, it is the post-tax rate of interest which will 
be linked to the rate of return on the underlying investment in real assets. «This 
means that, with an initial real yield of 10% in both countries, the market rate of 
interest would tend to be 20% in the CFT country and only 10% in the IT country. 
With double taxation relief on foreign investment income in the IT country, capital 
funds would be attracted from the IT country to the CFT country for investment 
in the CFT country. If the international capital market and both national capital 
markets were perfect, this attraction of capital funds would go on until physical 
investment in the CFT country was so expanded that the underlying rate of yield 
on investment in real asseta had fallen to 5%. The post-tax rate of interest in the 
CFT country would tend to be 5%, and the pre-tax market rate of interest would 
tend to be 10%».25 
As to the second one, the granting of both reliefs on foreign investments by 
the CFCT country is not justified for the same reasons mentioned in the case of 
CFITabove. 
Be that as it may, a second levy on businesses in the form of withholding tax on 
dividends, interest, rents, and royalties they pay to foreign investors and corporations 
24 Meade J. E. (1978), p.414-415. 
25 Meade J. E.(1978), p.232, 418. 
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(in respond to the current withholding taxes on payments abroad which could be 
credited against other taxes due in the foreign countIY), should be provided for in 
a way that would not cancel the competitive advantage Greece would enjoy under 
the CFT. The same should apply to Greek branches of foreign corporations, which 
maintain consolidated accounts for calculating the income tax, as a proxy for the 
withholding tax on cash distributions to foreigners by Greek corporations. 
Emigration and Immigration under Cash-Flow Income l'cLmtion 
Under a CFIT there would be incentive for people to leave a CFT country when 
they intend to dissave by living on previously accumulated capital, thus avoiding the 
CFIT and IT altogether. A special tax on the entire value of an emigrant's assets would 
be the case. The tax avoidance problem in this respect may not be that important. Under 
an IT country, a person need only move capital to a tax heaven country to avoid tax; 
under an CFIT country he himself would have to move .. However, any such tendency 
of CFIT citizens and residents to emigrate should be offset by the countervailing 
tendency of people to immigrate to the CFIT to avoid income taxes abroad. 
Corollary The application of CFT in Greece will enhance the relation between 
the after-tax rate of return to the resident and foreign savers and the before-tax 
domestic yield on investments, thus giving incentives for residents and foreign-
ers to invest domestically. The practical barrier to a CF'T system based upon the 
residence principle is that international harmonization would come slowly, if at 
all. Some industrialized countries would probably retain income taxes, and taxing 
income based upon its source (rather than its owner's residence) would remain 
attractive to countries that are net importers of capitaL 
6. Conclusions 
The liberalization of capital flows and the introduction of Euro within the frame 
. of the EMU, expose Member-States to an ongoing process of capital income tax 
competition as any harmonization attempts in this field of taxation have failed so 
far. Such a tax competition, calling for a reduction of effective tax rates to a common 
denominator in the EU, is quite painful for countries of high taxation and public 
debt, like Greece. Furthermore, this competition, carried on within the existing 
structures of the Member-States income tax, necessarily maintain the deficiencies 
of the predominant nature of this structures and the effects of expenditure tax ele-
ments which are variably incorporated therein (like the exemption of retirement 
contribution, capital allowances, etc), although at a lower level. One of the main 
deficiencies of the former is the non-neutrality of income tax between present and 
future consumption, setting the (post-tax) rate of return to the saver at a lower 
level than the (pre-tax) rate of return on investment. In contrast, the expenditure 
tax treatment of specific categories of saving and investments ensures the equality 
between the above rates of returns as a consequence of the main trait of this tax 
concerning its neutrality between consumption and saving. 
In this frame, Greece has the option of either following the competitive approach 
of the other Member-States within the given income tax structure or carrying for-
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ward a radical restructuring of its system towards the expenditure tax on the basis 
of cash-flow income tax. The second option gives the country the opportunity to 
avoid the potential trap of revenue degradation entailed by the first option. Instead 
of being drawn behind the tax rate reduction initiatives of the most flourishing 
competitors within the current structure of income tax, it will enhance its relative 
competitive position by shifting the taxation from income to consumption. Such a 
shift, effected on the basis of equal revenue yield, will prove more efficient in the 
domestic production, whereas it is expected to discourage exporting of capital and 
attract foreign direct investment. 
-Be that as it may, the impact on international arrangements and capital flows 
of a shift by Greece from income to expenditure taxation needs special probing. 
This paper mentions the relative merits of such a policy purporting to constitute a 
starting point for a thorough consideration in this respect. Some issues have only 
been touched on here, while still others have been set aside altogether. 
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Table A: The four Versions of Income Taxation * 
Forgone 
Consumption 
Earnings 
"'''''''-''-''''''''''''''.,''' 
Tax 
INCOME TAX 
(IT) 
(1) 
X( l - f) 750 
X 1500 
Xt 750 
-----.--~--~--.---.->--
Savings 
Rate of Return 
on Investment 
X(I-t) 
r 
750 
101% 
CASH FLOW 
INCOME TAX 
(CFIT) 
(2) 
X (I - t) 750 
X 1500 
PRE-PAID 
METHOD 
OFCFIT 
(3) 
X (I-t) 750 
X 1500 
.,.." """,,,"',,·w·········· ........ -.""-"''''"'''~,.-... -~ . --,--_ ...... __ .. ' .•. 
Xt 750 
.. ------"--
X 1500 X(l-t) 750 
r 101% r 10% 
INCOME TAX 
WITH 100% 
CAPITAL AlL-
LOWANCES 
(4) 
X(I-t) 750 
X 1500 
.~""'-"."-•... --... - --,,.,- _._" .. _ .......... .,,,.,, 
Xt 750 
X(l-t) 750 
r 10% 
Investments X(l-t) 750 X 1500 X( l-f) 750 X 1500 
-------------.----.. --~----.. ------------- .-"---.---
- -----------
Yield X(l-t)r 75 Xr 150 X (l-t)r 75 Xr 150 
---"-'---
Tax 
Net of Tax Yield 
Net Yield as % 
of Forgone 
Consumption 
X(l-t)rt 37,5 
r(l-t) 5% 
Xrt 75 
r H)% 
Xrt 75 
--"- .... --,,-"'--~~ .... -•... -
X (I-t)r 
.. . . ................ : ....... : ........ . 
75 X(I-t)r 75 
r 10% r 10% 
*The stmeture of the table is based on the concepts of income as defined for tax pUiposes in 
section 2 of the present paper. It is assumed that X (=1500), t (=50%) and r (=10%) stand 
for earnings, tax rate and rate of return respectively. 
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Table B: Foreign Source Tax Rates of Greek Capital Income Recipients and Double 
Tax Relief Methods of Residence (Greece) Country under Respective Double 
Taxation Treaties 
"'~,,*~""'_-.:>i~_""'_k""""_.r ____ ;;' __ '_ __ "'M _ _ _ AW ___________ _ 
Source 
COUidry 
(of Capital 
INTEREST INCOME 
Income 
Received 
by Greek 
Resident) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Tax Rate 
of Source 
Country 
% 
o or 10 (1) 
10 
10 
8 
10 
12 
10 
10 
8 
Netherlands 8 or 10 (3) 
Norway 10 
Double Taxa-
tion Relief 
Method of Resi-
dent Country 
(Greece) 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
DIVIDENDS 
Tax Rate 
of Source 
Country 
% 
Internal 
Law (2) 
15 
25 
18 
13 
Internal 
Law (2) 
25 
15 
'7 " I .J 
5 or 15(4) 
Double Taxa-
tion Relief 
Method of 
Resident COlln-
try (Greece) 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
PROFITS OF GREEK 
BRANCHES ABROAD 
Tax Rate Double Taxa-lion Relief 
ofSollrce M th d fR "_ Country , co o eSI 
% dent Country 
(Greece) 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Intelnal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
In ternal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Tax Exemption 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
•.... --.-----... ------- ._---
20 Tax Credit Internal Tax Credit Law 
. . .... ~.-.-.---.--
. -~--~~--~-"" ~ _. - -,~ .. -,-.. --"-.-. ,_· _ . --- - -•••• __ 0_0 ____ ••• 
Sweden 10 Tax Credit 
Switzerland 10 Tax Credit 
U.K. o Tax Credit 
U .S.A. 0(8) Tax Credit 
0 (5) 
5 ~ 15 (6) 
Internal 
Law (7) 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal Internal 
Law (9) Tax Credit Law 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
,------------------.,-------------- -------~-----
Source: Bilateral treaties of Greece with the respective countries. 
Comments: 
(1) The 10% rate applies to Greek recipients of interest, who participate with more than 50% 
in the equity capital of the Austrian debtor company. On the contrary, interest income from 
Austrian Government securities is taxed in Austria. 
(2) Dividends paid by Austrian or French resident company to Greek recipients, are taxed in 
both (source and residence) countries according to their respective internal legislation. Double 
taxation relief is succeeded under the tax credit method. 
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(3) The 8% rate applies to bank as recipients. 
(4) The 5% withholding tax applies to Greek recipients of dividend5 (paid by companies resident 
in Netherlands) who are cO/porate or Ltd companies controlling at least 25% of the equity capital 
of the former; whereas in the rest cases the withholding tax rate is 15%. 
(5) The application of this rate follows the specifications contained in the respective bilateral 
treaty. 
(6) The 5% withholding tax applies to Greek reCipients of dividends paid by companies resident 
in Switzerland participating by at least 25% in the equity capital of the former; whereas in the 
rest cases the withholding tax rale is 15%. 
(7) The internal dividend tmc law oflhe respective contractual counnies applies; double tax relief 
is provided for under the tax credit method accordingly. 
(8) Interests paid by USA legal person to Greek recipients (natural or legal persons), without 
pelmanent establishment in USA, are not subjected to USA taxation, unless the Geek reCipient 
is a company controlling, directly or indirectly, m ore than 50% of the votes of the fanner. 
(9) The USA internal dividend tax legislation applies; double tax relief is provided for under the 
tax credit method accordingly. 
Table C: Greek Source Tax Rates for .Foreign Capital Income Recipients and Double 
Tax Relief Methods of Residence Countries under Respective Double Taxa-
tion Treaties 
INTEREST INCOME DIVIDENDS (l) PROFITS OF FOREIGN BRANCHES IN GREECE Resident 
Country 
(of Capital 
Income. 
Recipient) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Tax Rate 
of Source 
Country 
(Greece) 
% 
o or 10 (2) 
10 
8 
10 
10 
10 
10 
8 
Netherlands 8 or 10 (7) 
Double Taxa· 
tion Relief 
Method of Res-
ident Country 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Rate 
of Sonrce 
Country 
(Greece) 
% 
Internal 
Law (3) 
25 
38 
Double Taxa-
tion Relief 
Method of Resi-
deut Country 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Rate 
of Source 
Country 
(Greece) 
% 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Double Taxa-
tion Relief 
Metbod of Res-
ident Country 
Tax Exemption 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit I Tax Internal 
Tax Credit ........... 4 ..7... .. ...§~~~IEti()11('4~._ .... _ .. l:<:,.v._ ... _ ... _ .. T.: ax Credit 
.. _ Law 
Tax Credit (5) 
Tax Credit (5) 
Ta'( Credit 
Tax Credit (5) 
Tax Credi t (5) 
Internal 
Law (3) 
25 
15 
38 
35 
Tax Credit (5) Internal 
Law Tax Exemption 
Tax Credit (5) Internal . 
I Tax ExemptIOn "aw 
Internal Tax Credit Tax Credit Law 
Tax Credit I Tax Internal Tax Exemption (6) Law 
Internal Tax Exemption Tax Credit (5) Law 
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-_.- .""'"""'---'-'---------
Norway 10 
- .. -. ----,,-~.-
Sweden 10 
Switzerland 10 
U.K. o 
U.S.A. 0(10) 
Tax Credit 40 Ta~ Credit Internal Law 
.~ ..• -, --.... ---- ~---------... ~--.-~---
Tax 
( 13) 
(~) 
Tax Credit 
Tax Credit 
0(12) 
35 
Internal 
Law (9) 
Internal 
Tax 
(13) 
(M) 
Tax Cre,dit 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal 
Law 
Internal Tax Credit Law (ll) Law 
Tax Exemption 
..•. ----~--
Tax Exemption 
T~ Exemption 
Tax Credit 
T~Credit 
~----~--------.~ ---~---.--------... 
Source: Bilateral treaties of Greece with the respective countries. 
Comments: 
(1) The bilateral agreement provisions about the dividends taxatioll may not have practical signifi-
cance, because after 1992 the total (distributed or not) corporate profits is taxed on the cO/porate 
level without any additional taxation of dividends on the personal level orthe recipients. 
(2) The 10% rate applies to Austrian recipients of interest, who participate with more than 50% 
in the equity capital of the Greek debtor company. On the contralY, interest income from Greek 
Government securities is taxed exclusively in Greece. 
(3) Dividends paid by Greek resident company to Austrian, or French recipients, are taxed in 
both (source and residence) countries according to their internal legislation. Double taxation 
relief is succeeded under the tax credit method. 
(4) Special exemption isprovided in the case the dividends recipient is a company. 
(5) Deduction of some portion of the tax is provided in specific circumstances. 
(6) Deduction of some portion of the tax isprovided in specific circumstances; whereas in other 
circumstances the tax exemption method is provided in cases where the Lw;embourg companies 
participate in the equity capital of Greek companies by more than 25%. 
. (7) The 8% rate applies to bank recipients. 
(8) The double taxation relief may be provided by the alternative methods of credit, deduction 
or partial exemption. 
(9) The internal dividend tax law of the respective contractual countries applies; double tax relief 
is provided for under the tax credit method accordingly. 
(10) Greek source interests paid to USA recipients, who do not have permanent establishment 
in Greece, are exempted from the Greek tax if the interest rate does not exceed the level of 9% 
annually. This exemption does not apply to the USA company which owns more than 50% of 
the equity capital of the Greek debtor company. 
(11) The Greek dividend tax law applies; double tax relief is provided for under the tax credit 
method accordingly. 
(12) The application of this rate follows the specifications contained in the re.lpective bilateral 
treaty. 
(13) Under special provisions. 
